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I. INTRODUCTION
AIRPORT SECURITY HAS CHANGED, and with thosechanges have come the ever-versatile elastic pants, slip-on
shoes, and various forms of comfortable garb to make undress-
ing in the security line more reasonable. But fashion aside, pas-
sengers have been conditioned by the nearly rote requirements
that those who are not part of the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration (TSA) PreCheck program must do: remove their
jackets, shoes, and belts and place their laptops in a separate
bin.1 Individuals who have traveled recently are all too familiar
with those echoing words. But while security screening has
changed greatly since the birth of mass air travel, there is one
area that lacks advancement—passenger identification.
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics indicates that more
than 851 million people in the United States took to the air in
2014,2 and the newest administrator of the TSA, Peter Nef-
fenger, stated that of those passengers, 660 million were
screened by the TSA.3 Thus, in an attempt to find the needle in
the haystack, the current security screening procedures are
“risk-based [and] intelligence-driven” to provide “expedited
screening for trusted travelers and to focus on high-risk and un-
known passengers at security checkpoints.”4 This manicured
screening method, collectively called a Risk Based Strategy
(RBS), is an attempt to “lessen the hay in the stack,” and in a
sense make the needle that much easier to find.5 But alas, this
method of threat prevention is not currently working. On June
1, 2015, major news sources reported that in an internal TSA
investigation, security agents failed sixty-seven out of seventy
tests (a failure rate of 95.7%), including the smuggling of weap-
ons.6 While the TSA neither confirmed nor denied the classified
statistics leaked by the media, Melvin Carraway, the administra-
1 See Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/secur-
ity-screening [https://perma.cc/AWB2-ENQ9].
2 Passengers, All Carriers – All Airports, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., http://www
.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 [https://perma.cc/T3PC-4GUD].
3 TSA: Security Gaps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
114th Cong. 1–2 (2015) (statement of Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transpor-
tation Security Administration), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/11/03/writ-
ten-testimony-tsa-administrator-house-committee-oversight-and-government-
reform [https://perma.cc/FV8A-YG8F].
4 Security Screening, supra note 1.
5 See id.
6 Justin Fishel et al., Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at US Airports,
ABC NEWS (June 1, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-un-
2016] FINGERPRINTS 563
tor of the TSA at that time, was immediately reassigned to an-
other department within the Department of Homeland
Security.7
The TSA’s self-proclaimed mission is to “deter, detect, and
disrupt threats,”8 but with a failure rate over 95%, that mission is
far from satisfied.9 Currently, all passengers are screened using
either advanced imaging technology (AIT), commonly called a
body scanner, or walk-through metal detectors for those passen-
gers who wish to forego the body scanner.10 If one refuses the
AIT scan or the metal detector, or sets off either of these instru-
ments, that person is subjected to a pat-down.11 Alas, all of these
invasive security techniques are a means of unveiling hidden
weapons, explosives, or other tangible objects that may be hid-
den on or in individuals’ possessions, but what of the individuals
themselves?
The importance of proper identification is the keystone to
threat identification, detection, and prevention. Yet, identifica-
tion may be one of the easiest security measures would-be ter-
rorists could currently exploit. For example, Malaysia Airlines
Flight 370 that went missing in March 2014 contained two pas-
sengers traveling with stolen passports.12 In today’s world of
heightened security scrutiny, how does one board a plane with-
out a passport, let alone while using a stolen passport? While the
frequency of false identification is likely very low, the risk of al-
lowing a falsely identified passenger through security is great.13
On that issue, a researcher in the area of facial recognition, Dr.
dercover-dhs-tests-find-widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881 [https://
perma.cc/GT9F-Q8UV].
7 Press Release, DHS Press Office, Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on
the Transportation Security Administration (June 1, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2015/06/01/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-inspector-general-findings-
transportation-security [https://perma.cc/V2XT-NHWR].
8 Transportation Security Administration Efforts to Address IG Findings: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th
Cong. 1 (2015) [hereinafter TSA Efforts] (statement of Peter Neffenger, Adminis-
trator, Transportation Security Administration), http://www.dhs.gov/news/
2015/09/29/written-testimony-tsa-administrator-senate-appropriations-subcom-
mittee-homeland [https://perma.cc/UGL9-B2TX].
9 Fishel et al., supra note 6.
10 Security Screening, supra note 1.
11 Id.
12 Katia Hetter & Karla Cripps, Who Travels with a Stolen Passport?, CNN (Mar.
11, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/travel/malaysia-airlines-
stolen-passports/ [https://perma.cc/9Z93-QT3V].
13 See Matthew Pryce, Dr. Megan Papesh, Louisiana State University – Flaws of Fa-
cial Recognition Tech, WAMC NORTHEAST PUB. RADIO (June 3, 2014), http://wamc
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Megan Papesh, examined one’s ability to match an individual to
a presented photo identification within a controlled study.14
The study indicated that one’s recognition rates were “incredi-
bly fallible, with error rates between 10 and 20 percent under
ideal laboratory-induced conditions.”15 As Dr. Papesh stated,
“[b]ecause society relies on face recognition and ID verification
for so many tasks, people are under the impression that we are
experts in this domain. Our research shows the precise oppo-
site.”16 Most astoundingly, the results of the study indicated that
“[w]hen observers infrequently encountered fakes, they failed to
catch approximately 45 percent of them, even when given multi-
ple opportunities to correct their errors.”17 The majority of pas-
sengers passing through airport security do in fact have valid
identification, making the false forms of identification that
much harder to spot. Thus, the need for better identification
standards becomes even greater.18
But in light of current research, consider that the TSA only
requires passengers over the age of eighteen to present photo
identification and a proper boarding pass.19 Examples of some
accepted identifications include driver’s licenses, state issued
photo identity cards, and passports.20 Even without proper iden-
tification, passengers may still be permitted per TSA regulations,
but such passengers could be subjected to “additional
screening.”21
Identification is arguably the first and best means of threat
detection and prevention. Much like Aristotle once stated, the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts, individuals are a far
greater threat in and of themselves than the means by which
they may choose to inflict harm. Thus, identification standards
in airport screening must be addressed to mitigate the potential
errors and shortfalls. Rather than solely searching travelers for
tangible threats, security checkpoints should proactively seek













fore, the TSA should implement fingerprint scanning as a
means of more reliable identification at airport security check-
points. The implementation of such a procedure is appropri-
ately rooted in case law, including Supreme Court precedent.
However, this comment will examine the likely societal backlash
and bring to light the contrasting issues of fingerprint imple-
mentation—privacy, safety, and security as a nation and as
individuals.
Part II of this comment discusses the historical background of
air travel threats, the security efforts to prevent them, and the
future of air travel threat prevention. Part III discusses the legal
standards for fingerprinting an individual, as well as the legal
justifications that allow for airport security checkpoint searches
and detention of one’s person and possessions. Part IV applies
the current law to the implementation of fingerprinting as a
means of identification and presents the potential problems and
protections necessary to safeguard individuals’ privacy. Finally,
Part V gives the conclusion.
II. SECURITY SCREENING IN AIRPORTS: TANGIBLE
THREAT PREVENTION
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To the millennial generation, September 11, 2001 (9/11),
may have served as the first time the airline industry was used as
a tool for political or tyrannical means, but threats to the airline
industry have been pervasive and persistent since the 1960s. In
the midst of widespread hijackings, or “skyjackings,” President
John F. Kennedy approved legislation in 1961 making air piracy
punishable by death or imprisonment, marking the first time
the government truly became involved in the private airline in-
dustry.22 From 1961 to 1968 there was an average of one plane
hijacking a year.23 Specifically, in 1969, “there were 40 at-
tempted hijackings of United States aircraft, 33 successful.”24
Without undermining the 9/11 attacks, September 11, 1970,
could in fact be deemed the beginning of the age of terrorism
22 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (codified at
49 U.S.C. §§ 101–80504).
23 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled in part by
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
24 Id.
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and the war against it.25 When a multitude of plane hijackings
occurred within a matter of days, President Richard Nixon re-
sponded with a statement on September 11, 1970, addressing
several ways to protect U.S. citizens and deal with piracy in the
skies.26 President Nixon immediately placed armed U.S. govern-
ment agents on planes, extended the use of electronic surveil-
lance at all U.S. airports and foreign countries, and directed the
Department of Transportation to hasten its discovery of ad-
vanced screening methods for detecting weapons and explosives
and to determine whether military metal detectors and x-ray de-
vices could be made ready for use in airports.27
By 1972, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an
emergency rule requiring all passengers and carry-on items to
be screened,28 with the purpose being “to prevent or deter the
carriage aboard its aircraft of sabotage devices or weapons in
carry-on baggage or on or about the persons of passengers.”29
Unfortunately, on March 9, 1972, a Trans World Airlines jet was
blown apart by a bomb placed in the luggage compartment, and
within twenty-four hours, bomb dogs found an explosive device
on a plane at John F. Kennedy International Airport.30 This
event immediately prompted the FAA to implement explosive
detection teams consisting of trained canines as part of the Ex-
plosives Detection Canine Team program.31 Two years later, the
Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 was adopted, which
prompted the use of metal detectors in airports, as well as the
25 Stephen Collinson, Nixon’s Own 9/11: When Terrorism Came of Age, CNN (July
29, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/27/politics/terrorism-1970s-
richard-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/BK78-Q36D].
26 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Richard Nixon: Statement Announcing a
Program to Deal with Airplane Hijacking, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 11,
1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2659 [https://per
ma.cc/T22L-BQRN].
27 Davis, 482 F.2d at 899–900.
28 See id. (quoting Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 72-26 (Feb. 6,
1972)).
29 Id. (citing 37 Fed. Reg. 2500–01 (Feb. 2, 1972)).
30 Bomb T.W.A. Jet; Device is Found on United Plane, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 9, 1972),
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1972/03/09/page/1/article/bomb-t-w-a-
jet-device-is-found-on-united-plane [https://perma.cc/Q6LJ-J4L9].
31 Utilizing Canine Teams to Detect Explosives and Mitigate Threats: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. 1





use of x-ray technology to examine passengers’ carry-on
luggage.32
B. MODERN SECURITY EFFORTS
Fast forward nearly thirty years to the terror associated with 9/
11. The TSA was created by the Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act on November 19, 2001, as a means of threat interdic-
tion following the coordinated attacks on 9/11.33 Until this
point, all of the aforementioned measures of advanced security
introduced were a means of identifying, confiscating, and
preventing tangible methods of harm.34 Specifically, the predom-
inant case in the 1970s, United States v. Davis, proclaimed that
magnetometer and x-ray scans were “justified as an administra-
tive procedure, an exception to the warrant rule tolerated as
necessary to insure safety in air travel.”35
But what of the persons behind the hijackings, threats, and
dangerous weapons or explosives? The TSA created the “No Fly
List” and “Secure Flight,” which are a means of tracking those
persons identified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and other intelligence agencies to be a threat to national secur-
ity.36 The No Fly List was quite literally a collection of names
that agencies compiled that were deemed unworthy of the right
to travel by air because they posed a risk to security.37 The Asso-
ciated Press suggested that as many as 10,000 names were listed
on the No Fly List in 2011.38 A secondary list of individuals,
called the “Selectee List,” laid out names of individuals who
would be subjected to greater scrutiny in the security screening
process but were still granted the ability to fly.39 Secure Flight
was implemented in 2009 as a watchlist matcher to verify that
32 Jane Engle, U.S. Aviation Security Timeline, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2011), http:/
/articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/12/travel/la-tr-airline-safety-timeline-20110612
[https://perma.cc/7CAF-245S].
33 Evolution Timeline, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/video/evolu-
tion/TSA_evolution_timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQC-W579].
34 See id.
35 United States v. Maldonado-Espinosa, 767 F. Supp. 1176, 1186 (D.P.R.
1991). See Part III.B for discussion on the warrantless search rationale in airports.
Davis was overruled in 2007 but only on the means by which an airport search was
deemed appropriate.
36 Dan Lowe, Note, The Flap with No Fly – Does the No Fly List Violate Privacy and
Due Process Constitutional Protections?, 92 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 157, 158–59
(2015).
37 Id. at 158.
38 Id. at 159.
39 Id. at 160.
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individuals scheduled to fly were not a part of the No Fly List by
running their name, gender, and date of birth against a series of
watchlists.40 The goal behind Secure Flight was to “prevent the
misidentification of passengers who have names similar to actual
people on the government watchlists and . . . allow more than
99% of travelers to print their boarding passes from home or
kiosks and avoid undergoing additional screening because of a
mismatch.”41 But once at the security checkpoint, these individ-
uals would be identified only by their boarding pass and photo
identification, which, as common knowledge and research now
indicates, can be easily forged and fooled.42 Alas, the develop-
ment of these lists and programs could all be for naught if the
individual can easily skirt the current identification standards.
C. TSA’S FUTURE OF AIRPORT SECURITY
On September 2, 2015, the TSA presented its five-year strate-
gic technology plan to the public in which it posed four themes:
Integrating principles of Risk-Based Security (RBS) in capabili-
ties, processes, and technologies;
Enhancing core mission delivery by focusing on a system (or sys-
tems) that analyzes threats, risks[,] and opportunities across the
aviation security environment;
Streamlining acquisitions, requirements, and test and evaluation
processes; and
Increasing transparency in engagement with stakeholders to en-
able innovation.43
The methodology of airport security screening is dramatically
changing from the aforementioned one-size-fits-all approach
that required scanning of all passengers stemming from the laws
40 Bob Burns, Individuals on the No Fly List Are Not Issued Boarding Passes, TSA
BLOG (May 11, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2012/05/individuals-on-no-
fly-list-are-not.html [https://perma.cc/P8NN-F8FT].
41 Bob Burns, Secure Flight: TSA Now Performing 100% Watchlist Matching for Do-
mestic Flights, TSA BLOG (June 11, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/06/
secure-flight-tsa-now-performing-100.html [https://perma.cc/PD4A-NFUX].
42 See Pryce, supra note 13.
43 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act: Examining Remaining Challenges:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. of Homeland Sec., 114th
Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Jill Vaughan, Assistant Administrator, Transporta-




of the ‘70s.44 In line with its four themes, the TSA hopes to re-
duce the scrutiny of search on those passengers who are deemed
“known” or “trusted” so that emphasis may be placed on trav-
elers who travel infrequently or sporadically with the implemen-
tation of programs such as TSA PreCheck and Secure Flight.45
Thus, those passengers who enroll in certain airline programs
may receive expedited security screening with minimal focus on
the search and detention of their person.46 The TSA began us-
ing RBS in October 2011 when TSA PreCheck was first imple-
mented to carry out the goals of reducing security checkpoint
lines and enhancing passengers’ experiences with security.47
To carry out those goals, Peter Neffenger, the head adminis-
trator of the TSA, proclaimed that he “envision[s] a future
where some known travelers will be as vetted and trusted as
flight crews. Technology on the horizon may support passengers
becoming their own ‘boarding passes’ by using biometrics, such
as fingerprint scans, to verify identities linked to Secure
Flight.”48 The evolution of screening is moving toward technol-
ogy that makes security checkpoints less invasive and more effi-
cient.49 Neffenger’s goal is to move away from screening known
and vetted passengers and require more extensive searches of
unvetted passengers.50 But in terms of identification verification,
current identification policy still only requires that an individual
present a valid photo identification or undergo a more thor-
ough security screening.51 This screening may include a hand
search of one’s carry-on and a pat-down of an individual’s per-
son, in addition to a wand metal detector search.52 Neffenger’s
implementation of biometrics into the security screening pro-
cess aligns with verifying the identity of passengers who have al-
ready submitted fingerprints through programs such as TSA
PreCheck and distances itself from merely tangible threat pre-
44 See supra Part II.B.
45 TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 3.
46 Id.
47 Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Office of Security Capabilities Strate-




48 TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 3.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 Identification, supra note 19.
52 Id.
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vention.53 Most importantly, Neffenger’s goal could be appro-
priately achieved through fingerprinting all passengers. As the
following section examines, Supreme Court precedent likely
supports widespread fingerprinting in the airport security con-
text. Perhaps in the near future security screening really will per-
mit travelers to act as their own human boarding passes,
especially as the law seems to support that notion as well.
III. STANDARDS FOR SEARCHING: FINGERPRINTS
AND AIRPORT SECURITY
A. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN FINGERPRINTS
In examining the requirements for fingerprinting or using bi-
ometric data, one must first understand the legal requirements
for identification in the airport and for obtaining a fingerprint
from an individual. The past decade of case law indicates that
the current identification policy that requires an individual to
present valid photo identification or undergo a more thorough
security screening has been upheld as constitutional.54 In 2006,
John Gilmore challenged the identification policy of the TSA
that required passengers to present identification before board-
ing or, in the alternative, undergo a more invasive search.55 Gil-
more was informed that without his identification he could
enter the terminal by becoming a “selectee.”56 This required re-
moving his shoes, passing through a magnetometer, a handheld
magnetometer scan, a body pat down, and a hand search of his
carry-on, in addition to a scan of his carry-on luggage.57 When
Gilmore reached the security checkpoint, he did not present
identification, refused to have his bag hand-searched, and was
denied access to the terminal.58 Upon asking for clarification of
the identification policy, Gilmore was told by security personnel
that the security directive that declared the identification policy
was “sensitive security information.”59 Gilmore alleged in his
complaint, inter alia, that this directive hindered his “right to
due process, right to travel, right to be free from unreasonable
53 See infra Part IV.B for the various programs in place now that currently use
biometric technology or require biometric data of travelers.
54 See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2006); Identifica-
tion, supra note 19.
55 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1129.
56 Id. at 1130.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1130–31.
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searches and seizures, right to freely associate, and right to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances.”60
The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the directive
did require a showing of identification or a selectee search, but
did not elucidate upon the TSA’s reasoning for identification.61
Due to the sensitive nature of the security directive, the court
heard the directive in camera to determine its finality.62 The
Ninth Circuit held that the request for identification did not im-
plicate Gilmore’s Fourth Amendment rights, as “ ‘[a] request for
identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a
Fourth Amendment seizure.’”63 Thus, because mere identifica-
tion is neither a search nor a seizure, asking for identification
cannot implicate the Fourth Amendment.64
Along these same lines, the fingerprinting of individuals may
also merely serve as a means of identification.65 In 1969, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Davis v. Mississippi that the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police picked up
twenty-five minors (including the defendant) and brought them
to the police station for fingerprinting to match fingerprints
found at the scene of a rape.66 The Court held that the finger-
printing of the defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights
because the defendant underwent two fingerprinting sessions,
he was interrogated, and the detention was not authorized by a
judge.67
Expanding upon the holding, the Court stated that deten-
tions without probable cause for the sole purpose of obtaining
fingerprints violated the Fourth Amendment rights of individu-
als.68 However, Justice Brennan added for the majority, “because
of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such deten-
tions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to
comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no
probable cause in the traditional sense.”69 Justice Brennan high-
lighted that the nature of fingerprinting is simply a means of
identification that may outweigh and trump other forms.
60 Id. at 1131.
61 Id. at 1136–37.
62 Id. at 1131.
63 Id. at 1137 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).
64 Id. at 1138.
65 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
66 Id. at 722, 728.
67 Id. at 728.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 727.
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Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious
intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the
probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks
an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be em-
ployed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need
only one set of each person’s prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting
is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool
than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject
to such abuses as the improper line-up and the “third degree.”70
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court revisited Fourth
Amendment rights and fingerprinting in Hayes v. Florida, a factu-
ally similar case.71 Again, the defendant was taken to the police
station without probable cause to arrest and was fingerprinted
without consent.72 There, the Court took the view that when
someone is forcibly moved to a police station, a seizure of one’s
person has taken place, which requires probable cause.73 How-
ever, Justice White also indicated, “[n]one of the foregoing im-
plies that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of
fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not
amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under
the Fourth Amendment.”74 White supported this statement by
echoing the Court’s position in Adams v. Williams, where the
Court held that “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order
to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in
light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”75 The corner-
stone of the holding indicates that fingerprinting an individual
in the absence of a warrant or probable cause becomes illegal
once a person is forcibly removed from his or her home or other
place, brought to the police station, and detained for investiga-
tion without judicial supervision.76
Based upon the holdings in Davis and Hayes, citizens’ reasona-
ble expectations of privacy in their fingerprints is actually much
lower than the general consensus might demand. The Southern
District of New York suggested that fingerprinting is a minimally
70 Id.
71 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812–13, 816 (1985).
72 Id. at 813.
73 Id. at 816.
74 Id. (emphasis added).




invasive technique of identification that may actually prevent law
enforcement abuse and produce more reliable, accurate re-
sults.77 The overarching theme presented by the court is that law
enforcement must have a warrant to seize one’s person to obtain
fingerprints, but how might this apply to individuals who are al-
ready lawfully detained in an airport context?78 Assuming argu-
endo that those individuals in airport security screening are not
lawfully detained, might those checkpoints fall into the “nar-
rowly defined circumstances” that may allow fingerprinting even
though there is not probable cause in the “traditional sense”?
With current technology, it is possible to take someone’s finger-
print in the field, and with limited detention, as fingerprint scans
can be done in a matter of seconds. It is likely that the narrow
exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court could be satisfied,
and thus, there would be no implication of Fourth Amendment
rights. However, to fully examine the issue of fingerprinting as a
means of airport security, this comment will analyze whether it
would be possible to implement such a procedure even if the
Fourth Amendment did apply.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AIRPORTS:
COMPETING INTERESTS
In order to understand how the TSA may implement biomet-
ric technology into the existing security screening process, it is
important to understand how the current screening methods
are legally justified. While it may be apparent that airport
searches invade one’s reasonable expectation of privacy through
the use of metal detectors, body scanners, and pat-downs, courts
have consistently upheld airport searches under various excep-
tions to the warrant requirement such as reasonableness, con-
sent, and the administrative search doctrine.79 The following
sections present the boundaries of one’s Fourth Amendment
rights and how they have been applied in the context of airport
security.
77 Thom v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
78 See id.
79 The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated which justification suffices, but
it has indicated that the government properly supported its governmental inter-
est in seeking to uphold administrative searches by giving as an example airport
security screenings. “The point is well illustrated also by the Federal Govern-
ment’s practice of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board com-
mercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on luggage, without any basis
for suspecting any particular passenger of an untoward motive.” Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
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1. Has a Search Taken Place?
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ rights to “be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . . . and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”80 In Katz v. United States, the Su-
preme Court laid out the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
and the warrant requirement.81 Justice Stewart stated that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”82 To deter-
mine the reasonableness of searches, subsequent courts have ap-
plied Justice Harlan’s two-prong test from Katz, which requires
that (1) a person have a subjective expectation of privacy; and
(2) members of society are willing to accept that expectation of
privacy as reasonable.83 Thus, when one has an expectation of
privacy that society would be willing to accept as reasonable, a
warrant is required to search.84 Alternatively, when no search
has taken place, the government is not required to have a
warrant.85
The Supreme Court recently reexamined its position on
whether a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment in
United States. v. Jones.86 The Court held that a trespass by govern-
ment agents with the intent to obtain information constituted a
search, and thus their actions required a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment.87 There, the defendant was under investi-
gation by the FBI.88 The government received a warrant to place
a global positioning system tracking device on the vehicle of
Jones’s wife in D.C within ten days.89 However, the government
placed the tracker on the vehicle eleven days later in Mary-
land.90 The Supreme Court heard the case to determine
80 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 361.
84 See id.
85 Id.
86 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
87 Id.




whether the warrantless use of the tracker violated the Fourth
Amendment.91 Justice Scalia opined that the government occu-
pied private property to get information, and while the occupa-
tion alone would not be an invasion of privacy, the intent of the
government to obtain geographic information impeded the de-
fendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.92 Rather than nar-
row the holding in Katz, the Court added this additional
requirement that one must first examine whether a trespass has
occurred with the intent to gain information, and if not, the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard remains.93
Directly tied to the use of private, personal information in the
airport security context is Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in
Jones.94 Alito added that pervasive and prolonged surveillance of a
citizen’s activities may constitute a search, even if that surveil-
lance occurs in a public place.95 Without specifically identifying
what constituted a prolonged surveillance, Justice Alito noted
that the tracking of the vehicle’s movements in Jones for four
weeks surely crossed that threshold.96 Alito supported this argu-
ment by recalling the past securities afforded by individuals:
In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were
neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and
costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue
in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for
four weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multi-
ple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance.97
Consider these comments in the context of implementing
greater identification standards in airport security. It may be just
as easy to track one’s movements through the logs used for the
biometric identifiers associated with particular individuals.98
Surely the scanning of 660 million travelers constitutes a perva-
sive search in the grand scheme of things.99 However, proper
91 Id. at 949.
92 Id. at 950–51.
93 See id. at 951–52.
94 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 964.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 963.
98 See infra Part III.C for discussion on the privacy rights of individuals and the
use of fingerprint technology.
99 See TSA: Security Gaps, supra note 3 (TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger
stated that 660 million travelers were screened by TSA in 2014).
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security techniques, encryption, and privacy protocols would
minimize the risk of an intrusion by the government.
2. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects one’s person and posses-
sions against unreasonable search and seizure, and there must be
probable cause for a warrant to issue.100 Thus, in determining
the constitutionality of each facet of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court has carved out exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
requirements through legal vehicles such as reasonableness,
consent, and the administrative search doctrine. Each exception
focuses largely on the reasonableness of the search.101 The
means by which courts have previously justified physical searches
of individuals and how these applications could be applied to
mere fingerprint data are discussed below. The following sec-
tions outline the major turning points in court decisions.
a. Consent
The first court to rule on airport security screenings in 1973,
in United States v. Davis, focused primarily on the balancing of
the needs of the individual and the government.102 In 1971, the
defendant attempted to pass through airport security at San
Francisco International Airport with a gun in his briefcase.103 At
the gate, an airline employee told him that a routine security
search was needed. The employee then proceeded to take Da-
vis’s briefcase, open it, and discover a gun.104 In a quote that
exemplifies the current conditions of air travel, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that “[t]he search of appellant’s briefcase was not an
isolated event. It was part of a nationwide anti-hijacking pro-
gram conceived, directed, and implemented by federal officials
in cooperation with air carriers.”105 However, the court stated
that a balancing regime based upon the premise that the
searches conducted in airports at that time were based upon a
“general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative
purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation.”106
100 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled in
part by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
102 See id. at 912–13.
103 Id. at 896.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 897.
106 Id. at 908.
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The Ninth Circuit summarily defined the boundaries of the
administrative search doctrine within the airport security con-
text to be reasonable if “(1) it is no more extensive or intensive
than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or
explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; and
(3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly.”107
Thus, the court found that the search was constitutional without
a warrant because the danger to air travel was “grave and ur-
gent” and the potential damage to property, persons, and air
travel was great.108 However, the ability of an individual to
choose not to fly was imperative, as the reasonableness require-
ment of the administrative search could only be satisfied if the
intrusiveness of the search could be matched with the need that
justifies it.109
Other courts relied upon this notion and modified it, holding
that a person subjected to a search has impliedly consented by
choosing to board with the knowledge of widespread air piracy
and notices of airport security measures.110 But by 2007, the
Ninth Circuit overruled the holding that passengers may “con-
sent” because “requiring that a potential passenger be allowed
to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes
little sense in a post-9/11 world. Such a rule would afford ter-
rorists multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport se-
curity by ‘electing not to fly’ on the cusp of detection until a
vulnerable portal is found.”111 Thus, while Davis was initially an
attempt to apply an administrative search regime, subsequent
courts refuted the notion that consent was a necessary factor,
causing the test to rely only upon the balancing of interests and
underlying motive.112
b. Administrative Search Doctrine
To this day, the Supreme Court has not explicitly professed
the appropriate Fourth Amendment rationalization regarding
airport security screening, but it has alluded to the administra-
tive search doctrine as being the leading constitutional justifica-
107 United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
108 Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
109 Id.
110 United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1974).
111 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2007).
112 See id. at 961–62.
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tion.113 In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case
on the administrative search doctrine, New York v. Burger, which
has defined administrative searches for all subsequent analy-
ses.114 In Burger, state regulatory statutes allowed warrantless
searches of automobile junkyards as an exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement in an attempt to deter crimi-
nal behavior.115 The holding postulated that warrantless
searches of heavily regulated industries without probable cause
were constitutional because those industries had lower expecta-
tions of privacy, which, paired with the substantial governmental
interest, outweighed the invasion of privacy.116 The balancing
scheme laid out by the Supreme Court took into account (1) the
substantial governmental interest that informs the regulatory
scheme; (2) whether the warrantless inspection was necessary to
further the regulatory scheme; and (3) whether the regulatory
scheme was a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.117
In 1989, Justice Kennedy compared the Von Raab case in
which the court applied a balancing of government and individ-
ual privacy rights with that of the airport screening process.118 In
Von Raab, the Court decided a special needs case in which cer-
tain U.S. Customs workers were drug tested as a job require-
ment. The pertinent factors considered by the Court were that
the tests were not turned over to law enforcement, applying for
a government position was enough to expect a lower expecta-
tion of privacy, and that the government had an interest in en-
suring front line personnel are of high integrity and are
physically fit.119
The point is well illustrated also by the Federal Government’s
practice of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to
board commercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on
luggage, without any basis for suspecting any particular passen-
ger of an untoward motive. Applying our precedents dealing with
administrative searches, see, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco,120 the lower courts that have considered the question
113 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
114 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
115 Id. at 693.
116 Id. at 711–12.
117 Id. at 702–03.
118 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3.
119 Id. at 679.
120 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). In Camara, the Court used a balancing approach
very similar to that seen in Burger and simply applied that balancing of personal
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have consistently concluded that such searches are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.121
Likewise, in 1997, the Court again suggested that the adminis-
trative search doctrine was indeed the appropriate standard to
apply in airport screening.122 In Chandler v. Miller, the Court
considered whether candidates for public office in Georgia
could be ordered by state law to submit to drug-screening before
filing for candidacy.123 In deciding the case, the Court examined
the government interest—effective administration—paired with
the privacy interest of politicians.124 The Court ultimately deter-
mined that because politicians are constantly in the public light,
the government interest did not outweigh the privacy interests
of politicians to mandate drug-testing.125 However, in doing so,
the Court again compared the case with administrative searches
in the airport screening context because they directly impacted
public safety.126 As Justice Ginsburg aptly stated,
Where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as “reasona-
ble”—for example, searches now routine at airports and at en-
trances to courts and other official buildings. But where, as in
this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged.127
The lower courts are also adopting the administrative search
doctrine, but without the concern of traveler consent.128 In
2011, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Fourth Amendment challenge
under the administrative search doctrine in which the court
held that the use of body scanners was constitutional.129 The
court was persuaded by other circuits and the suggestions of the
Supreme Court in holding that “screening passengers at an air-
port is an ‘administrative search’ because the primary goal is not
to determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but
privacy and governmental interest to safety inspections of homes without a war-
rant issued on probable cause as part of a regulatory scheme for public safety.
121 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3.
122 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
123 Id. at 308.
124 Id. at 318.
125 Id. at 321.
126 Id. at 323.
127 Id. (citations omitted).
128 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10
(D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
129 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
580 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
rather to protect the public from a terrorist attack.”130 In balanc-
ing the interests of individuals and the government interest for
public safety, the court held that the intrusion upon individual
privacy was necessary for the promotion of “legitimate govern-
mental interests.”131
But in consideration of the indisputably invasive body scanner
technology, the court stated that the body scanner was a crucial
technological advancement as it could not only detect guns and
weapons, but also liquids and explosives, which greatly out-
weighed the individual privacy concerns.132 Passenger privacy
was deemed protected by a facial distortion on all images pro-
duced by the body scanners, deleting it as soon as the passenger
was cleared.133 Additionally, and ironically, the court held that
the privacy interests of individuals were also protected because
any passenger may opt out of the body scanner search “in favor
of a patdown.”134 This opt out option of course begs the ques-
tion, does that mean that consent is still a factor? The answer
being, of course, that consent is likely a factor in the reasonable-
ness of the administrative search, but it is not a dispositive factor
in the constitutionality of the search. Thus, in the D.C. Circuit’s
eye, a Hobson’s choice is, nevertheless, still a choice.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
As the Davis court poignantly stated, “[l]ittle can be done to
balk the malefactor after such material [explosive or weapon] is
successfully smuggled aboard, and as yet there is no foolproof
method of confining the search to the few who are potential
hijackers.”135 Nearly half a century has passed since the Davis
court decision, but the same concerns for air safety are still pre-
sent and real. To confront the terror that existed on September
11, 1970, the Court implemented what was at that time an inva-
sion of privacy—metal detectors.136 But by the late 2000s, the
implementation of an even greater physical invasion of privacy
was implemented: advanced imaging technology body scanners.






135 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled in part by
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
136 See id.
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ogy has been disdain and uneasiness, but with each successive
advancement comes the potential for a subtle inoculation to the
public’s senses.
In the current world of metadata, each small invasion of per-
sonal privacy has resulted in an inoculation by a million en-
croachments, rather than death by a million slices. Courts have
upheld the constitutionality of technology that scans one’s body
with such detail that the TSA subsequently implemented tech-
nology to blur facial features and private areas for the officer
who views the image in a private screening room.137 This tech-
nology that allows a TSA officer to know your body a bit better
than you do was supported by more than eighty percent of
Americans in 2010.138 With this in mind, is the average Ameri-
can ready, willing, and able to provide a fingerprint to take to
the skies? With hesitation, maybe. Are the courts ready, willing,
and able to require fingerprints to take to the skies? Likely. If
the TSA required travelers’ fingerprints to board a plane, it
would likely satisfy the current precedent. A fingerprint submis-
sion is arguably far less invasive than the information obtained
from a body scanner. As such, the law is ripe for discussion re-
garding the legal boundaries and the personal privacy concerns
in light of the current technology.
A. APPLICATION OF FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY IN CURRENT
AIRPORT SCREENING
Lest you disagree with the Supreme Court, fingerprinting is
considered a less invasive intrusion into one’s right to be let
alone.139 The Supreme Court offered that a “brief detention in
the field for the purposes of fingerprinting” with only reasona-
ble suspicion is not necessarily impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.140 Of course, the Davis and Hayes cases were de-
cided in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively. Thus, it could be said
that the Justices in those cases were unaware of the vast techno-
logical advancements, such as an iPhone that uses one’s finger-
137 Deema B. Abini, Traveling Transgender: How Airport Screening Procedures
Threaten the Right to Informational Privacy, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 120,
125–26 (2014).
138 Stephanie Condon, Poll: 4 in 5 Support Full-Body Airport Scanners, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2010, 6:56 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-4-in-5-support-
full-body-airport-scanners/ [https://perma.cc/CZ33-ADKP].
139 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
140 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985).
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print as a password.141 However, the opinions indicate quite
clearly that fingerprints are not private because they are so
openly obvious on an individual and left behind each place the
individual visits and touches.142 That said, Davis and Hayes are
still deemed good law. Moreover, in Katz, Justice Williams dis-
cussed this point exactly by clearly stating that “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”143
Along those lines, fingerprints identify who you are and poten-
tially where you have been, but not what you have done. Rationalize
that with the understanding that the government can retrieve
information voluntarily turned over to a third party, such as nu-
merical data entered into or received on a phone, called a pen
register.144 The government need only obtain a subpoena or
provider consent to obtain pen registers as those do not amount
to a search.145 Because fingerprints are left everywhere and only
provide that a particular individual has been in a particular loca-
tion, that surely has less potential criminality attached to it than
to information regarding who an individual has talked to and
for how long. Certainly communication records reveal more pri-
vate and potentially incriminating information, and even there
the government has a low bar to reach by a mere showing that
the information sought is relevant to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation!146 Even further, the Third Party Doctrine established in
United States v. White states that information voluntarily over-
turned to third parties has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.147 The Third Party Doctrine has been extended to video
surveillance,148 financial records,149 personal trash,150 and even
to overhead aerial surveillance.151 Mere identification by means
of a fingerprint surely amounts to a lesser expectation of privacy
141 About Touch ID Security on the iPhone and iPad, APPLE, https://support.apple
.com/en-us/HT204587 [https://perma.cc/X8EJ-XXHJ].
142 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 812–13.
143 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
144 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979).
145 Id. at 745–46; see Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3121.
146 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123.
147 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
148 United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2003).
149 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
150 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
151 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989).
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than one’s financial records and aerial surveillance, both of
which may be obtained by the government without a warrant.
Because fingerprinting is merely a means of identification,
courts have attempted to refute any other holding, going so far
as to state “the public has long recognized [fingerprinting] as a
valuable and reliable means of identification, and to suggest that
a stigma attaches when it is so used is to fly in the face of real-
ity.”152 Therefore, implementing fingerprint scanning to travel
via air likely does not implicate the Fourth Amendment and
would be constitutionally permissible if it were to be imple-
mented today. However, to further emphasize how the imple-
mentation could be allowed even if it did amount to a search, the
following reviews the implementation under the assumption
that a search has occurred under the Jones or Katz standard.153
Under the Jones test, the use of a fingerprint at the airport
would not be deemed a search because there is no intent of the
government to obtain information, but rather the government
seeks mere identification.154 Additionally, the information ob-
tained through a fingerprint would be no more of a require-
ment than the current use of a driver’s license and a boarding
pass—identification.155 It could be stated that Justice Alito’s con-
currence in Jones could pertain to such use of fingerprints be-
cause it would amount to a pervasive and prolonged search due
to the sheer amount of fingerprints that the TSA would be
screening.156 However, this argument fails on at least two
grounds. While Jones was not an exceptionally narrow holding, it
was limited to physical intrusions to obtain personal informa-
tion.157 While it is true that consent is not necessary under the
current administrative search justification, if fingerprint submis-
sions were mandated, courts may determine that travelers con-
sented to their fingerprint being used and have thus waived
their right to Fourth Amendment privacy, much as courts have
held in prior case law.158 Secondly, Jones stands for technology
used to obtain personal information about an individual.159
152 Thom v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
153 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
154 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951.
155 See Identification, supra note 19.
156 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
157 See id. at 949.
158 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2007).
159 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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Courts have appropriately indicated that fingerprint informa-
tion is neither personal nor requiring of special treatment.160
Because there may or may not be a physical intrusion by the
government to obtain personal information from an individual,
a search must be examined under the two-part Katz analysis. Ap-
plication of Harlan’s concurrence in Katz easily leads one to the
conclusion that individuals do in fact have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their fingerprints, but is society willing to ac-
cept that privacy interest as reasonable?161 Today, society views a
fingerprint as uniquely personal and, as such, deserving of pri-
vacy. In stark contrast, dated precedent indicates that a finger-
print is not as personal and private as some believe.162 Thus,
under Katz, it is quite likely that fingerprinting an individual
amounts to a search due to societal expectations. However, even
assuming that it does amount to a search, the exceptions out-
lined in Davis and Hayes could surely be satisfied.163 Because the
Court emphasized that a brief detention in the field in which
there is only reasonable suspicion would not necessarily be im-
permissible, this use of a fingerprint may also be deemed rea-
sonable, notwithstanding the fact that it is indeed a search
under Katz.164
Just as previous airport screening techniques have been justi-
fied under the administrative search doctrine, a requirement
that one submit a verified fingerprint to the TSA, the airlines, or
both prior to boarding a plane falls squarely within the adminis-
trative search exception as well. Therefore, even if a search is
found under the Jones or Katz tests, fingerprinting would still be
permissible under the current use of the administrative search
doctrine.
First, consider the test laid out in United States v. Aukai, where
the Ninth Circuit stated that an airport screening search is con-
stitutional so long as it is “no more extensive nor intensive than
necessary, in light of the current technology, to detect the presence
of weapons or explosives and that it is confined in good faith to
that purpose.”165 As previously discussed, this standard is appli-
160 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727 (1969).
161 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967).
162 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Davis, 394 U.S. at 727.
163 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Davis, 394 U.S. at 728.
164 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.
165 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)
(internal alterations omitted) (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913
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cable for the tangible threats that may be deterred by searches.
The use of biometric data does not fall into that category, but
even if considered an invasive search, the inconvenience suf-
fered by travelers would be so minute that submitting finger-
print data would hardly tip the scale toward the invasion being
more extensive or intensive than necessary.166 Just as finger-
prints surely evoke a lesser expectation of privacy than financial
records or cell phone records, it is doubtful in today’s data-
driven market that one would consider a fingerprint scan as in-
vasive as a body scan.167
Courts have upheld the administrative search exception so
long as the search is part of a regulatory scheme that furthers
the interest of the government by preventing the carrying of ex-
plosives or weapons onboard without overstepping the bounda-
ries of personal privacy.168 While biometric data would not
prevent the carrying of explosives or weapons directly, it would
indirectly prevent travelers on the No Fly List from gaining ac-
cess to air travel, with or without explosives or weapons. The
potential for harm coming from known threats who are already
placed on a No Fly List is substantial, regardless of whether that
person is also carrying weapons or explosives.169 More impor-
tantly, because the current method of simply confirming one’s
identity through a photo identification and boarding pass can
be so easily fooled or forged,170 fingerprinting tips the scale in
favor of reasonableness. The individual privacy invaded by a fin-
gerprint submission would again be de minimis compared to that
of the highly invasive body scanner, especially in comparison to
the governmental and societal interest served—personal and na-
tional security.171
(9th Cir. 1973), overruled in part by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
2007)).
166 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Davis, 394 U.S. at 727–28.
167 See Abini, supra note 137, at 125–27 (discussing the invasive nature of body
scanning technology and the requirements TSA implemented to mitigate the
intrusion).
168 See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960.
169 For instance, consider Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, where two passengers
boarded the plane using stolen passports. While only speculation may arise from
that incident, fingerprint identification could prevent these gaps in the screening
process. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
170 See Pryce, supra note 13.
171 For instance, consider that a known terrorist would probably not attempt to
board a plane without taking precautions to shield their identity through disguise
and false identification.
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B. PRIVACY INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS
The biggest hindrance to the TSA’s implementation of finger-
print scanning in lieu of one’s boarding pass and photo identifi-
cation is simply personal privacy. While aged precedent may
suggest that a fingerprint is merely an identifier, society may not
quite conform to that notion—at least not yet. However, finger-
print data has become a key identifier across many platforms,
including Visa applications.172 Currently, to enter the United
States, the mantra of the Department of State is “secure borders,
open doors,” which is indicative of its requirement that all in-
coming foreigners must submit ten fingerprints.173 The catch?
Biometric data is only taken on incoming Visa holders.174 Foreign
nationals who wish to enter our country are clearly subjected to
a lower expectation of personal privacy than we personally ac-
cept as reasonable to be part of our society. But with the grow-
ing threat of homegrown terrorists and radicals, now is the time
to consider that instead of reducing our expectation of privacy,
we must demand greater standards of identification for all.175
Thus, if biometric data is to be implemented, it should apply not
only to incoming foreign flights, but also to outgoing and do-
mestic flights as well.
The possibility of a slippery slope of invasive activities and the
short-term memory of society is obviously of great concern with
each new security measure. Some authors have posited that we
are now in an age of “micro-police state[s],” where airport secur-
ity measures result in an erosion of societal expectations, namely
privacy.176 In a discussion of TSA’s PreCheck program, one au-
thor even stated “[p]ublic memory is often short, and citizens
frequently become desensitized to government privacy inva-
sions, particularly ones that are deemed necessary for national
security.”177 However, fingerprint submissions to the govern-
ment have not necessarily been met with hesitation by all. At the





175 See Carrie Blackmore Smith & Joel Beall, Number of Homegrown Terrorists is
Rising, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2015, 10:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2015/01/17/number-of-homegrown-terrorists-is-rising/21940159/
[https://perma.cc/CV65-9LHA].
176 Roger Clark, The Inalienable Right to Fly, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 60.
177 See Katie Cristina, Comment, The TSA’s New Precheck Is Beginning to Look A
Lot Like Capps II: The Privacy Implications of Reviving the Tenets of the Failed Predeces-
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publication of this comment, more than four million people
have registered for TSA PreCheck.178 PreCheck enrollment re-
quires submission of biographic information, an eighty-five dol-
lar fee, and fingerprints to receive a rapid screening process at
the airport.179 While four million is a small drop in the bucket
compared to the entire population of travelers, the fee associ-
ated with PreCheck is nearly the same price as a direct flight
from Dallas/Fort Worth Airport to Los Angeles International
Airport. Given the chance as part of their ticket price, would
people be willing to submit fingerprints that would be kept for
only a short period to verify their identity? Voluntary enrollment
into TSA PreCheck indicates that may or may not be an answer
in the affirmative.
It has further been posited that because the Fourth Amend-
ment exceptions are satisfied by such a low threshold in the sake
of fighting terrorism, the only true means of personal protec-
tion is through the democratic process.180 Thus, the fear driven
mentality of the citizenry may feel that the use of programs such
as TSA PreCheck and the laws surrounding airport security
screening will allow the implementation of just about any new-
fangled interdiction effort.181 However, arguments along those
lines are inapplicable to fingerprinting as a part of airport
screening, even outside of Fourth Amendment scrutiny
First, the fingerprints would be rapidly taken in the field, as
the goal of TSA is to have a fast-moving, free-flowing security
checkpoint, and thus the Fourth Amendment would not be im-
plicated.182 The technology currently exists and could easily be
implemented into airports within the boundaries previously laid
out by the Supreme Court.183 Second, fingerprinting at the air-
port would in no way invoke the other factors considered in
Hayes and Davis like forcible movement to the police station or
police interrogation.184 Lastly, fingerprints are commonly re-
quired throughout many fields. All members of the security ex-
sor, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 648 (2013). The author’s comment was referring to
the implementation of PreCheck, which is a voluntary program.
178 TSA Pre✓® , TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/precheck/ [https://
perma.cc/538D-JMS9].
179 Id.
180 See Cristina, supra note 177, at 648.
181 See id. at 649.
182 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
183 Id.; see Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985).
184 See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Davis, 394 U.S. at 728.
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change must be fingerprinted,185 lawyers must submit
fingerprints for application to the bar,186 and some states re-
quire that bartenders, day care workers, and even real estate
workers must submit fingerprints.187 Fingerprinting across those
fields is necessary as a means of identification and fraud preven-
tion, and usage of fingerprinting should be no different for such
an elective means of travel.
C. NECESSARY PROTECTIONS
The potential for a government too bent on national security
at the expense of personal privacy and autonomy is certainly at
the edge of everyone’s mind. Thus, while airport security screen-
ing falls squarely into the administrative search doctrine, to fully
satisfy the public and coax the privacy needs of individuals, im-
plementation of fingerprint scanning will require several protec-
tions. Requiring individuals to submit fingerprints before flight
to confirm their identity, and again to confirm their identity at
the security checkpoint, requires a delicate Burger analysis and
special needs balancing of an individual’s right to feel let alone
and that of the government interest—public safety.188 In order
to have a qualified fingerprint upon which to reference travelers
as they pass through security checkpoints, the TSA will likely
need to implement fingerprinting offices at airports or privately
contracted offices. This process could follow similar protocols as
those currently used with the TSA PreCheck program.189 Addi-
tionally, because an “original” fingerprint would necessarily
need to be stored as a reference point, there are necessary pro-
tections to ensure individual privacy, security of data, and peace
of mind. Therefore, three issues must be addressed: (1) law en-
forcement limitations; (2) temporal limitations; and (3) spatial
limitations.
First, collection of fingerprint data from individuals prior to
flight must be stored so that it can be accessed later to confirm
the identity of the individual. Of utmost importance is that the
185 Achraf Farraj, Refugees and the Biometric Future: The Impact of Biometrics on
Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 891, 925 (2011).
186 Fingerprint Information, TEX. BOARD L. EXAMINERS, https://ble.texas.gov/fin-
gerprint-information [https://perma.cc/NVE7-LXKA].
187 Farraj, supra note 185, at 925.
188 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987).
189 TSA Pre✓® , supra note 178 (indicating that one need only locate an enroll-
ment center, make an appointment, and bring a birth certificate and driver’s
license, or a passport, to have fingerprints and a small interview conducted).
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fingerprints collected are used to identify, not penalize, travelers.
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court upheld drug testing of specific
classes of U.S. Custom’s workers based upon several factors, but
of importance was that the information received from the drug
tests was not turned over to law enforcement.190 Thus, all finger-
print data obtained by the TSA or airlines in any implemented
fingerprint identification scheme must be placed under seal and
made inaccessible to law enforcement agents. This, of course,
begs the question, what of the terrorists that are identified? One
must remember that the goal of implementing fingerprint iden-
tification is merely confirmation of identity and alternatively
that those individuals that may be identified through the No Fly
List may or may not be subject to criminal prosecution indepen-
dent of their predicted threatening nature.191 Law enforcement
agents may not arrest individuals for their potential to commit
crimes, lest we enter into a world similar to that of The Minority
Report.
Second, because the threat of data breach is a grave problem
that requires proactive rather than reactive measures, the length
of time the fingerprint data should be stored must be balanced
with this risk.192 The government interest of public safety lies in
properly identifying individuals, but that requires having a fin-
gerprint comparison on file. Currently, biometric data stored
for asylum seekers and refugees is stored for seventy-five years,
but as some have professed, the duration of storage must be as
short as necessary.193 An opt-out feature of sorts should also be
implemented, in which individuals are allowed to withdraw their
fingerprint data from storage with a confirmation of deletion
sent to the requesting individual. This ensures that individuals
who wish to fly can submit fingerprints, travel, and then subse-
quently remove their fingerprints from the database with the
only caveat being that they must repeatedly submit qualifying
biometric information before a future flight. Because of the risk
190 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989).
191 Lowe, supra note 36, at 159.
192 See Robert Hackett, Massive Federal Data Breach Affects 7% of Americans, TIME
(July 9, 2015), http://time.com/3952071/opm-data-breach-federal-employees/
[https://perma.cc/RM97-7CYQ].
193 Farraj, supra note 185, at 933.
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of data breaches, necessary encryption of all stored fingerprint
data must be implemented as well.194
Lastly, because fingerprint data would be used at each security
checkpoint through which a traveler passes, it would be easy to
keep a record of geographic history. But again, the government
interest is in public safety, which necessarily begins with confir-
matory identification as a means of threat prevention, and not
law enforcement. To remedy the problem of geographic track-
ing, the fingerprint that is taken at each checkpoint should be
deleted after the traveler has been cleared at the security check-
point, much like the current procedure calls for in the images
produced from body scanners.195 Thus, while the original finger-
print submission is maintained as a reference point, the airport
security checkpoint is merely a cross-reference with a short shelf-
life. Alternatively, if it is found that law enforcement agencies or
the TSA has stored, tracked, or monitored the travel of individu-
als by their fingerprints, judicial scrutiny would be necessary as
broad sweeping surveillance of such a large amount of data
would fall within the pervasive government search coined by Jus-
tice Alito.196 Thus, individuals’ fingerprints would necessarily be
safeguarded by the affirmative measure of deleting all point of
entry fingerprints and through judicial scrutiny into any breach
of such protocol under United States v. Jones.197
D. SAFETY AND THE BENEFITS OF FINGERPRINTING
The overarching theme of the TSA, the government, and
even the courts in examining airport security checkpoints is
safety.198 The circuit courts have justified,199 and the Supreme
Court has mentioned, that it too has justified airport searches
under the administrative search doctrine,200 likely because the
194 See Hackett, supra note 192. Note that an entire article could be devoted to
what would be an appropriate level of encryption and protection of individuals’
fingerprints.
195 See Tobias W. Mock, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Impli-
cations of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 213, 230 (2009).
196 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
197 See id.
198 TSA Efforts, supra note 8.
199 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10
(D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled in part by United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
200 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
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overarching threat of air safety was so grave. But as stated ear-
lier, no exception is needed for fingerprints as precedent and
scholars pointedly assert.201 Thus, the true cusp of safety starts
with identifying the threat. The threat need not be a gun, explo-
sive, or any tangible object, but merely a person who poses a
significant threat to society. Government agencies already com-
pile lists of these individuals in an attempt to combat this prob-
lem,202 but the current methods of identifying travelers to
positively identify threatening people are too weak, too easily
fooled.203 Because the No Fly list operates merely on biographic
data, fingerprint data would create a cohesive scheme of air
safety that combines the current data used for the No Fly list
with the fingerprints supplied by travelers wishing to fly.204
Lastly, as a means of proactive threat interdiction, requiring a
fingerprint might deter would-be terrorists, as forging a finger-
print is a much greater task than simply a photo identification
and boarding pass.
V. CONCLUSION
For some, air travel is almost a daily or weekly event, for
others perhaps merely for vacation, but for all it is a concern.
Society is concerned about the safety of flying, the hassle of se-
curity, and the loss of many liberties simply by visiting a family
member or traveling for work. Air travel has been a means of
terror for nearly four decades now, and the time is ripe for ad-
vancements not only in the security screening, but also in the
threat identification. Threat prevention starts with traveler iden-
tification. Because technology has advanced to allow for fast,
easy, and minimally invasive scanning of fingerprints, the law
should keep to its word. The Supreme Court has spoken and as
such deemed one’s fingerprint to be merely a means of identifi-
cation and thus, there is no need to carve or pry for exceptions
under the Fourth Amendment. The law is ready to accept fin-
gerprinting as a means to identify and prevent threats and with
the advances in technology, perhaps society’s views may shift in
the coming years to match that of precedent.
201 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816–17 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727–28 (1969); David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee
DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1139 (2013).
202 Lowe, supra note 36, at 159.
203 Fishel et al., supra note 6.
204 Lowe, supra note 36, at 159–60.
